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common gaming house within s. 176 (2) (b). It would appear that in
the minority view a landlord, who was unaware of the fact that his
tenant was operating a common gaming house on the rented premises,
would not be within the summary conviction portion of the relevant
section, as he could not be then said to knowingly permit a place to
be let or used for the purpose of a common gaming house. However,
by an application of s. 168 (1) (h) i) a "keeper" includes (i) an
owner . . . of a place, the "unknowing" landlord could be brought
within the indictable offence subsection of s. 176 which involves a
maximum sanction of two years imprisonment. If this were the intention of Parliament it is submitted that the purpose must be more
clearly expressed before such an anomalous result should obtain. The
above illustration exemplifies the inconsistencies that are achieved
by an application of the liberal meaning of "keeper" in section 168 (h)
to section 176. Such an application was made by the minority in the
real question in issue in this case.
In conclusion, it is submitted the Court arrived at a desirable
and logical interpretation of the existing section in the Code, and its
approach is consistent with a well established practice of taking a
restrictive view of penal statutes.
J.A.P.

More v. The Queenl AND DELIBERATE -

CRIMINAL LAW - CAPITAL MURDER - PLANNED
DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY IN CANADA.

This is an appeal from the Manitoba Court of Appeal 2 affirming
the conviction of the appellant for capital murder. The facts of the
case are simple and tragic. The accused was happily married but he
ran into financial difficulties. His wife, who helped with the family
income through her earnings, had co-signed for a debt of the appellant.
Unable to accommodate his most pressing creditor, the accused was
advised by their solicitors that his wife's wages would be garnisheed
on September 28th, 1962. This upset the accused who feared that
disclosure of the situation would have a bad effect on the happiness
of his wife, blissfully unaware of his financial plight. On September
25, the accused bought a .22 calibre rifle and 50 cartridges which
(unknown to his wife) he placed in the cellar of his house. On September 27, at 6 a.m. he shot his wife through the head while she
was sleeping. He then proceeded to prepare various documents which
testified to his devotion and love for his wife and his feeling that
knowledge of the debts would so upset his wife as to ruin her happiness. At 8 a.m. he telephoned his wife's employer and informed him
that she was ill and would not report for work. At 10 a.m. he drove his
sister downtown and said nothing of the killing of his wife. At 4 p.m.
1 [1963] S.C.R. 522
2 43 W.W.R. 30.
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he attempted suicide by shooting himself in the head but did not die.
At 8 p.m. he telephoned the police. The evidence is not contradicted.
The theory of the Crown was that the accused loved his wife
but having accumulated heavy debts, of which he had not fully
informed her, he became worried and depressed and that, when
threatened with legal action which would have disclosed his true
financial position to her, he shot her and attempted to commit suicide.
On the evidence, the killing of his wife was motivated, intended,
planned and deliberate, thus amounting in law to a capital murder
under ss. 201(a) (i) and 202 A 2 (a) of the Criminal Code. In defence,
the accused, who admittedly killed his wife on September 27th,
pleaded that at the time he was an automaton, devoid of will, not
knowing what he was doing, and that the Crown had failed to prove
that the homicide was planned and deliberate. According to the expert
medical evidence of two psychiatrists called by the defence, the
accused was suffering from a diminution of his ability to think,
reason and decide at the time of the offence.
The defence relied on the effect on the jury of the expert testimony to show that the requirement of "deliberate" in s. 202A (2) (a) of
the Criminal Code had not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt
by the Crown.
The learned trial judge did not permit the evidence of the
experts to go to the jury without comment. He quoted from text-book
writers to the effect that expert witnesses are biased in favour of
the side that calls them and that therefore little weight should be
given to their evidence. The direction to attach little weight to this
evidence is the ground of appeal and the issue of law before the
Supreme Court of Canada. The notice of appeal reads:
The learned trial judge so misdirected the jury as to the weight to be
attached to the medical evidence called by the defence that
3 the (accused)
appellant was not properly convicted of capital murder.

Speaking for the majority Cartwright J. held:
The recital of the facts and the evidence of the appellant as to what
occurred at the moment of the discharge of the rifle. .. show that it was
open to the jury to take the view that the act of the appellant in pulling
the trigger was impulsive rather than considered and therefore was not
deliberate. The evidence of the two doctors and particularly that of Dr.
Adamson, also quoted by my brother Judson, that, in his opinion, at the
critical moment the appellant was suffering from a depressive psychosis
resulting in "impairment of ability to decide even inconsequential things,
inability to make a decision in a normal kind of a way" would have a
direct bearing on the question whether the appellant's act was deliberate
4
in the sense defined above; its weight was a matter for the jury.

Fauteux J. in his dissent states:
Acceptance of appellant's submission that mental defect or disease not
sufficient to render an accused legally irresponsible under s. 16, Criminal
Code, may nevertheless operate to reduce the degree of the crime charged
is tantamount to introducing in the Canadian law a new and secondary
3 Supra, footnote 1, p. 525.
4 Ibid., p. 534.
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test of legal irresponsibility as was done in England prior to the enactment of the provisions of s. 202 A (2) (a) by The Homicide Act, 1957
(U.K.), c. 11, of which s. 2(1) and (2) read:
2(1) Where a person kills or is a party to the killing of another, he shall
not be convicted of murder if he was suffering from such abnormality
of mind (whether arising from a condition of arrested or retarded development of mind or any inherent causes or induced by disease or
injury) as substantially impaired his mental responsibility for his acts
and omissions in doing or being a party to the killing.
2(2) On a charge of murder, it shall be for the defence to prove that the
person charged is by virtue of this section not liable to be convicted of
murder.
Undoubtedly aware of these provisions, the Canadian Parliament deliderately refused to adopt them. If the appelant's submission Is
accepted, it follows that the Canadian Parliament has adopted rather
obliquely a policy more generous than that of the English law. 5

In substance then Fauteux J. states that if it was the intention
of the Canadian Parliament to incorporate this test, it would have
done so expressly.
The Supreme Court of Canada reversed the Court of Appeal of
Manitoba and held that the learned trial judge should have allowed

the jury to give proper weight to the expert medical evidence and
therefore ordered a new trial. The evidence related to whether the

act of the appellant in pulling the trigger was impulsive rather than
considered.
It

is submitted that the ratio of this case constitutes an in-

corporation into our law of the doctrine of diminished responsibility
which was adopted by the English Homicide Act from Scots law.
The Homicide Act, 1957, imported [across the Border] a new defence to
a charge of murder, namely, diminished responsibility. The purpose of
the provision is to save the judge from having to pass a formal sentence
of death in a case of insanity outside the M'Naughton rules, where
the sentence would not in any case be carried out, and also to give a
measure of recognition to mental abnormality short of insanity. On a
verdict of diminished responsibility, resulting in a conviction of manslaughter, the judge may award such term of imprisonment or other
punishment or treatment as he thinks fit.6

Cassells J. has carefully considered the effect of the doctrine.
He says:
(it) preserves the life of a person charged with capital murder who is
not insane but is so mentally abnormal as not to be fully responsible
for his crime. Such a decision should be in the field of the Jury, as is
'provocation' as a defence and not be dependent upon executive clemency.7
...

S. 202A of the Criminal Code divides murder into capital and
non-capital. The purpose is to prevent capital punishment in cases
where it has little value other than misdirected vengeance. The rule
in More v. The Queen is in keeping with this purpose as it allows
evidence of mental abnormality which establishes that an element
5 -bid., pp. 531-2.
6 Glanville Williams, CriminaZ Law (2nd ed.), p. 541.
7 (1964) 7 Can. Bar Journal 9.
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of the crime is not present and that the Crown has not proved its
case.
A final consideration in this case is whether the grounds for
Appeal are proper. One argument is that the direction of the trial
judge of the weight to be attached to certain expert evidence is not
a legitimate ground for consideration by an appellate court. The
trial judge who has first-hand impressions of witnesses (experts
included) is best qualified to comment on the weight to be given
to certain evidence, and this comment is integrally a part of his
directions to the jury. However, the majority's view that the instruction amounted to a decimation of the whole defence, it is submitted,
illustrates the contention that in these circumstances, questions of the
weight of evidence become questions of law rather than matters for
judicial discretion.
Whether or not the doctrine will be recognized in Canada in its
full force remains to be seen. However, if as a result of this case
evidence of mental abnormality short of the requirements of s. 16
of the Criminal Code is admissible to show that the crime was not
deliberate, then it is possible that a verdict of manslaughter, rather
than the mere reduction from capital to non-capital murder will be
obtained.
J.E.L.

The Queen v. Laroche, [1963] S.C.R. 292.
The accused respondent was convicted of theft, by unlawfully
converting to her own use $10,000 belonging to the Town of Eastview.
The Ontario Court of Appeal quashed the conviction and directed a
new trial. The Crown sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court
on the question of law whether the Court of Appeal erred in law
in holding that the trial judge misdirected the jury as to the theory
of the defence. The respondent opposed the motion on the ground that
the judgment of the Court of Appeal was based on two grounds, one
of which did not raise a question of law alone.
Cartwright J. delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court,
granted leave to appeal on the question set out in the notice. By the
case The Queen v. Warner,1 where a Court of Appeal has quashed a
conviction on two grounds of which one is, and the other is not,
appealable to the Supreme Court an appeal to the Supreme Court
from the judgment is not open. But despite cases in other jurisdictions
holding that a non-direction or misdirection by the trial judge in
dealing with evidence is not a question of law alone, Cartwright J.
followed Brooks v. ?.2 and held that the Supreme Court may enter1 [1961] S.C.R. 144.
2 (1909) 2 Cr. App. R. 197.

